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International competition over soft power has largely transformed from image promotion and 
cultural diplomacy to benchmark setting. Benchmarks breed discourses and discourses embody 
power. The article argues that the soft power index building has turned into a battlefield where 
different values, norms and development models struggle for legitimacy through quasi-scientific 
validations. By critically examining the methods employed by two soft power indexes, Portland 
Soft Power 30 Index and China National Image Global Survey, this article unpacks the mechanisms 
by which institutions from western and emerging (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS)) states embed political values, interests and agendas in the selection of data, indicators and 
treatments of data. The article finds that while the soft power indexes originating from Western 
organizations largely normalized liberal values and the current international hierarchy, the Chinese 
national image survey provides a more self-reflective approach to soft power measurement.
Keywords
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Introduction
Introduced by Joseph Nye Jnr in 1990, the concept of soft power has gained considerable traction 
in global academic and policy fields. Intellectuals have in turn considered concepts such as ‘nor-
mative power’ (Manners, 2002, 2006) and ‘ideational power’ (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016) to 
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engage with the idea that power can be achieved by co-opting and building attraction instead of 
coercion. While many scholars in the western world hold that ‘universal values’ such as democ-
racy, human rights and freedom of speech are the source of soft power, their counterparts from 
emerging states tend to rely on culturally specific values and cultural heritage factors. Indeed, 
Wagner (2010) has praised the non-violent and peaceful conflict mediation model represented by 
Mahatma Gandhi and often represented in Bollywood movies, as the source of an Indian style 
defensive soft power. Russia’s endorsement of conservative values (Hudson, 2015), its linguisti-
cally based community ‘Russkiy Mir’ (Russian world) is likewise considered as an alternative 
model of soft power. In terms of the practical application of the concept, however, China is the 
most committed practitioner (Kurlantzick, 2007). Since the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, 
China has developed a well-funded public diplomacy package which includes holding interna-
tional mega-events (Cull, 2008), establishing overseas broadcasting media (Li, 2017; Thussu, de 
Burgh, & Shi, 2017), and funding cross-cultural exchange programmes (Hartig, 2015).
In the past decade, soft power has undergone an ‘evaluative turn’, evolving from academic dis-
cussion to policy implementation and benchmark setting. The measurement of soft power is fuelled 
by a market demand from nations wishing to gauge the potential and reach of their soft power. 
However, such measurement is bedevilled by the ambiguity of the concept. In other words, the 
measurement cannot be operationalized without answering the key question: What types of values 
or cultural products are considered attractive, and by whom?
In the interest of resolving this puzzle, this article considers two soft power evaluation reports. 
The first, The Portland Soft Power 30 Report by Portland Communications (hereafter referred to 
as ‘Portland 30 Index’), represents an indexing/benchmarking approach that prioritizes western 
civilizational values and norms. A second case is The China National Image Global Survey (here-
after referred to as ‘CNIGS’), which features a distinctly opinion-centred, self-evaluative approach.
The article proceeds as follows: First, we establish the soft power concept as a value-laden dis-
course, drawing on Foucault’s knowledge/power theory. The key conceptual frame discussed is 
benchmarking. This is followed with three research questions and a brief discussion of the data 
collection method. In the ‘Data analysis and findings’ section, we analyze how bias is embodied in 
soft power evaluations in both Portland 30 Index and CNIGS. We identify three mechanisms by 
which biases are embodied: the strategic selection of data, indicators and the treatment of data. To 
conclude, we discuss how a west-centric distribution of sources of data and selection of indicators 
contribute to maintaining the liberal paradigm and legitimizing the dominant world order.
Theoretical framework
Constructing a regime of truth by benchmarking
Benchmarking, as a form of evaluative knowledge production system, is widely adopted by inter-
national actors. It serves to normalize and legitimize political values and ideas. As in most knowl-
edge production processes, benchmarking is not a neutral field of endeavor, but an institutionalized 
discursive mechanism infused with power relations (Introna, 2003). As Foucault (1971) reminds 
us, knowledge is not absolute but a product of ‘regime of truth’, where certain facts are selected, 
organized and redistributed as truth. What benchmarking represents, moreover, is an extreme ‘nos-
talgia for a quasi-transparent form of knowledge, free from all error and illusion, and behind the 
concept of repression, the longing for a form of power innocent of all coercion, discipline and 
normalization’ (Foucault & Gordon, 1980, p. 117).
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Technically, benchmarking refers to a comparative assessment of the performance of the objects 
in question against certain principles and standards. It makes use of evaluative techniques such as 
‘audits, rankings, indicators, indexes, baselines’ (Broome & Quirk, 2015, p. 820). The social impli-
cations of benchmarking, however, go beyond mere calculation. First, benchmarks redistribute 
authority and status among actors. International organizations, for instance, adopt benchmarking as 
a tool to assert authority by framing problems in a certain way, fixing the meaning of norms, 
thereby redefining collective interests (Clegg, 2010; Kramarz & Momani, 2013). Second, dissemi-
nation (of benchmarks) shapes the discursive environment of policy issues (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004) and the public perception of governmental performance, both domestically and internation-
ally (Høyland, Moene, & Willumsen, 2012). Because of the ostensibly scientific nature of bench-
marking exercises, the resulting rankings, once promulgated, are difficult to dislodge from public 
discourse (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010). Third, benchmarks enable a type of indefinite discipline 
over remote actors. Benchmarks function through stimulating the self-regulating behaviour of 
international actors under the pressure of status seeking (Bruno, 2009; Kelley & Simmons, 2015; 
Porter, 2015).
The promises that benchmarking cannot deliver
As impressive as benchmarking is, it can hardly deliver its promised neutrality and objectivity. In 
Broome’s words, benchmarks generate a form of ‘constructed objectivity’ by ‘means of rhetori-
cally appeal(ling) to the ostensibly neutral language of technocratic assessment and numerical 
comparison’ (Broome & Quirk, 2015, p. 821), whereas actually it is ‘troubled by questionable 
methodology and data collection biases’, as ‘the use of transnational knowledge … cannot be sepa-
rated from political values and policy reform preferences’ (Broome, Homolar, & Kranke, 2018, p. 
3). It is, therefore, meaningful to clarify how errors and political bias can be embedded in index 
building.
The first problem that plagues index building is the pressure of quantifying everything. 
Quantification ‘requires reliable and comprehensive information’ (Broome & Quirk, 2015, p. 827) 
which can only be retrieved and stored with abundant financial and personnel resources. Considering 
the information gap between North and South, and West and East, data-driven benchmarks will 
inevitably reproduce the international hierarchy between the developed core and peripheral nations. 
Moreover, a prioritization of quantitative data over qualitative and commensurable data leaves the 
qualitative dimensions ignored or distorted. For instance, to measure human development, the 
well-known Human Development Index (HDI) developed by United Nations selected ‘national 
incomes’, ‘life expectancy’ and ‘schooling’ over ‘self-worth’, ‘dignity’ and ‘creativity’ because of 
the difficulty of commensuration of the latter three items (Høyland et al., 2012).
The second problem is that the benchmarking process itself risks simplifying reality and assum-
ing national performance as universally ‘evaluatable’, irrespective of historical and structural con-
texts (Broome & Quirk, 2015). After examining the methodologies adopted by The World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business Index (EDB) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Broome et al. (2018) conclude that 
these benchmarks serve to arbitrarily downplay structural divergence and suggest deregulation of 
business as a panacea for economic prosperity. The relevant evaluative benchmarks on government 
transparency, freedom of the press and political corruption, in a similar vein, simply attribute com-
plex and divergent non-western political practices to ‘bad’ performance, as defined by a western-
centric understanding of human rights or ‘good governance’ (Kelley & Simmons, 2015).
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Finally, benchmarking normalizes values through strategic selections of reference points. 
Establishing an accepted standard is a prerequisite for benchmarking. However, such selection 
invariably perpetuates a dichotomy between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practice; contested norms are 
framed within a normative hierarchy. Neoliberalism, as an illustrative case, was enshrined in a 
wide range of indexes to guide nations towards economic growth and achieve a favourable inter-
national reputation. Nations who deviate from this prescription will be blamed and shamed on a 
‘watchlist’ or suffer a decline in the ranking (Broome et al., 2018; Kelley & Simmons, 2015).
Mission impossible? Benchmarking soft power
Given the popularity of soft power, opinions on what aspects are important, and how it should be 
measured, are surprisingly divergent. The reason can be attributed to both the intangibility of soft 
power resources and the fuzziness of its working mechanism. First, soft power resources tend to be 
intangible and the attractiveness of foreign policy is contingent on consistency with self-proclaimed 
political values. Democracy, for instance, though prevailing as a universal value, and supported by 
the United States in particular, gained its autonomous status once it was accepted as a global norm: 
the problem is the United States’ international image is damaged if the United States’ behaviour 
violates this principle (Lock, 2010). The measurement of culture can also be tricky. Considering 
the enormous cultural-historical heritage of civilizational states such as Egypt, India and China, 
one may wonder why their soft power resources are evaluated far below behind a nation (the 
United States) that has a history of no more than 250 years (Fan, 2008).
Another factor that plagues the resource-centered measurement approach is its challenge in 
capturing soft power effects. Scholars, including Nye, resort to attitude changes in the poll as a 
signal of soft power effects (Nye, 2008; Smith, 2007; Treverton & Jones, 2005), while others insist 
on policy change as a reference for soft power evaluation (Anguelov & Kaschel, 2017; Knack, 
2004). However, what makes effect-oriented approaches dubious is the ambiguity of opinion for-
mation and policy-making systems, which resembles a black box that can never be dissected to 
analyze the actual proportion of the contribution of soft power initiatives (Layne, 2010).
Based on the general problems of benchmarking and the elusiveness of soft power, the follow-
ing section focuses on the methodologies of two benchmarks: Portland 30 Index (2015–2018) and 
CNIGS (2013–2017). We argue that the credibility of soft power benchmarking is distorted by 
arbitrary selection of data, indicators and treatment on data (modelling). The article argues that 
China’s international image survey serves as a self-evaluative monitor, which offers a model for 
developing states to obtain information autonomy and escape the status of ‘being represented’. 
This approach, though contributing to promote the democratization of soft power discourse, fails 
to provide an applicable framework for other nations to evaluate their soft power.
Methods: research questions and design
The question of how power and values are embedded in the building of soft power benchmarking 
is operationalized into three questions:
1. How does the selection of data reflect the power structure of the index?
2. How is the hierarchy of values embedded in the selection of indicators?
3. How does the arbitrary treatment of data lead to misleading rankings?
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To start with, the selection of data is split into two dimensions: (1) the types of data and (2) the 
sources of data. The data that benchmarking relies on are generally divided into two types: subjec-
tive and objective data. Subjective data are the polling results that are used to measure the effects 
of soft power in public opinion level. Objective data, on the contrary, refer to quantifiable reports 
that are used to measure the soft power resources. The point of checking the type of data is to 
clarify what aspect of soft power the benchmark is measuring. In addition, we examine the geo-
graphical distribution of sourcing institutions of the data to investigate how geo-cultural contexts 
shape the values of index building. This parameter only applies to Portland 30 Index as CNIGS 
exclusively relies on opinion polls.
Furthermore, our examination of the selection of indicator refers to the concept of ‘content 
validity’, which evaluates ‘whether the scope of a benchmark provides adequate coverage of the 
multiple dimensions of an issue area to effectively capture and measure performance, or whether 
critical dimensions are excluded’ (Broome et al., 2018, p. 6). The authors assume, by including 
certain indicators in the index and excluding others, indexes de facto serve to prioritize specific 
values at the expense of others.
The last aspect of soft power measurement is the treatment of the data in the process of index 
building. For the Portland 30 Index, we examined the weighting applied on objective and subjec-
tive data and the regression model used to elicit the new coefficients that are used to weigh the 
scores of sub-indices in the final model. We consider the reliability of the varying coefficients and 
the validity of treating favourability as a proxy for the dependent variable – soft power effects, 
which is supposed to be the predicted value of the index model. As for CNIGS, we discuss the 
problems of presenting data based on the stage of development: developed and developing coun-
tries, and age trichotomies: 18–35, 36–50 and 51–65.
Data collection
Bearing in mind the rationale to compare how institutions from western developed nations and 
emerging states embed their values, worldviews and policy agendas in soft power benchmarking, 
we chose two indexes: Portland Soft Power 30 and CNIGS. The selection was based on their origi-
nality, authority/influence and representativeness.
For the Portland 30 Index, our first consideration is its global influence. Since its release in 
2015, the annual reports of the Portland 30 Index have been widely cited by media and think 
tanks. A rise in ranking is interpreted as a rise in international status for countries such as China 
(Global Times, 2018a), France (Le Figaro, 2017) and Russia (Picreadi, 2016); an exit or a decline 
of ranking will engender status anxiety and can even be mobilized to discredit certain politicians 
(Bach, 2018). Second, the sponsoring agencies, Portland, a UK based communication consul-
tancy and its new joint partner (2017–2018), the US-based research institute – University of 
Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy, signify the Western origins of this index. By 
saying this, we do not imply that the Soft Power 30 Index is an official construct of western gov-
ernments, but suggest that the Portland 30 Index epitomizes a benchmarking imprinted by Western 
perspectives about soft power.
Under the authorship of Jonathan McClory, the Portland 30 Index has evolved from a 15-page 
report with the name of ‘The new persuaders’ (IfG-Monocole Index) in 2010 to a comprehensive 
map of the global soft power landscape which amounted to 180 pages in 2018. The IfG-Monocole 
Index laid the foundation for Soft Power 30 Index in terms of main categories and combinations of 
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subjective and objective data (McClory, 2010). Therefore, we collected seven reports including 
IfG-Monocole Index reports: The New Persuaders Index I, II, and III (McClory, 2010, 2011, 2012), 
and Portland 30 Index reports: The Portland Soft Power 30 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 for the purpose 
of tracking the evolution of the Portland 30 Index. What is worth noting is that the final report, The 
Soft Power 30 2018, will be taken as the main object of discussion.
CNIGS, on the contrary, is selected as the soft power index created by institutions from an 
emerging power – China. The sponsoring agencies of CNIGS are China Foreign Languages 
Publishing Administration; Millward Brown, a UK-based communication consultancy; Charhar 
Institute, a Chinese independent think tank; and Lightspeed GMI, an international digital data col-
lection agency headquartered in the United States. China Foreign Languages Publishing 
Administration, namely, China International Publishing Group (CIPG), is both an external public-
ity oriented public institution affiliated to the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of 
China and the largest foreign-language publishing organization in China. Although the series of 
CNIGS received wide recognition from Chinese media ranging from Xinhuanet (Xinhua, 2018a), 
China Global Television Network (CGTN; 2018) and Global Times (Global Times, 2018b), the 
ripples it creates in the overseas media are barely visible.
In comparison with the Portland 30 Index, CNIGS does not seek to provide a universal bench-
mark global soft power performance, but to ‘provide targeted, (temporally) comparable and viable 
recommendations for boosting the effect of China’s international communication activities’ (Guo, 
2018). The research questions are designed to elicit overseas perceptions about China on a broad 
spectrum of dimensions: overall image, domestic and international political performance, Chinese 
citizens, economic development/commodities and technology and innovation as well as traditional 
culture. The systematic nature and comprehensiveness of CNIGS have made it a reliant guidebook 
for China to conduct self-evaluations of its soft power performance compared to the other years. 
As with the Portland 30 Index, the four CNIGS reports of 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016–2017 will 
be included to shed light on the evolution of this index.
Data analysis and findings
The Portland Soft Power 30 Index
Selection of data. To begin with, soft power can be assessed with three dimensions: (1) soft power 
resources, (2) public opinion changing and (3) political policy changes. The first approach evalu-
ates soft power from a resource-potential angle; the other two are from an outcome angle. The 
approach to equal soft power with attitude change manifest in opinion poll, though was widely 
applied with ‘the Pew’s Global Attitudes Project, the BBC World Service’s Country Ratings Poll, 
or the Anholt-GFK Roper Nation Brand Index’ (McClory, 2015), failed to shed light on ‘the avail-
able resources and an understanding for where they will be effective’ (McClory, 2015). What 
McClory proposes, instead, is to add objective data – a tangible manifestation of the ‘intangle’ 
culture assets – to subjective opinion poll result, thus providing a guidebook for monitoring their 
soft power repository and exploiting their soft power potential into de facto international influence. 
This rationale in itself is conducive. However, without taking into account the diverse cultural 
background, political legacy and the development stage of countries, the lessons that the develop-
ing countries can draw on will be limited. Given the fact that soft power is developed by Nye to 
consolidate Pax Americana, what McClory (2018) argued as theoretically sound frameworks actu-
ally works to entrench the structurally privileged liberal values in the world system.
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In terms of the source of data in the Portland 30 Index, we take the occurrence of the data source 
as our unit of analysis and code each source according to the geographical location of its institu-
tion. For instance, the indicator ‘Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP’ is said to be 
compiled from ‘United Nations Conference on Trade, and Development Statistics/World Bank/
Various’. Therefore, this sub-metric will be divided into three sources: United Nations Conference 
on Trade, Development Statistics and World Bank. ‘Various’ means the source is data are left with-
out specification, which will be recorded as null. Then, the sources will be coded for the location 
where their headquarter is, as illustrated in Appendix 2.
First of all, we found the geographical location of the organizations that serve as data source 
tends to be concentrated in western-developed countries. We identified overall seven countries that 
accommodate the sourcing agencies for the Portland 30 Index: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Germany, Spain and Australia, which all belong to the club of 
western-developed countries. What is worth noting is the predominance of Anglosphere countries. 
We found that 67% of the sources originated from the United States, the United Kingdom, or 
Australia, and the rest 33% comes from Europe (see Figures 1 and 2). As a result, it is safe to con-
clude that the geographical distribution of source institution is hugely slanted towards western 
powers. Without denying the neutrality or the growing cultural diversity of international organiza-
tions and companies, we realize that the Portland 30 Index is more susceptible to the ideological 
and cultural traditions of Anglo-European states than other regions. And this west-slanted geo-
graphical distribution could contribute to normalize the worldview of western states and legitimize 
their leading positions in the international hierarchy.
Within the Western Bloc, there are differences in terms of the data produced. The United States, 
without any doubt, is home to most of the sourcing institutions in Digital, Education, Enterprise 
and Government dimensions. In the Cultural dimension, 9 out of 13 sources were dominated by 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of source institutions (Portland 30 Index).
Source: McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30–2018. London: Portland.
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Figure 2. The proportion of data sources by country (Portland 30 Index).
Source: McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
Figure 3. Geographical distribution versus categories of the Portland 30 Index’s sources institution.
Source: McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
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European states including the United Kingdom. These phenomena are understandable considering 
the predominance of the United States in politics, business and research and innovation fields. 
Germany and Australia, on the contrary, are the main force in Engagement metric construction 
with their information on diplomatic resources, networks and global footprint (see Figure 3). 
Among all of the sources, the World Bank shows a strong presence as a sourcing institution, con-
tributing 22 out of 78 sources to the overall Portland 30 Index building (see Figure 4). As Kramarz 
and Momani (2013) illustrated, producing abundant knowledge is a way for the World Bank to 
obtain recognition. The World Bank has provided data for all the sub-indices except for culture. 
Not only are business and government-related indices such as ‘Ease of Doing Business’ and 
‘Income inequality – Gini coefficient’ created by the World Bank but education and digital sub-
metrics also resort to the World Bank for information such as ‘Academic journal article publica-
tion’ and ‘Number of Internet users’ (see Figure 5).
Selection of indicators. If the selection of data indicates where the soft power index intends to cap-
ture soft power, then the selection of indicators reveals how it captures soft power. The selection of 
indicators of the Portland 30 Index is constrained by hegemonic western culture, and in turn con-
solidates western cultural hegemony by legitimizing Anglo-American political values, economic 
models and even cultural tastes. To measure soft power on quantitative bases, Portland developed 
a wide-ranging package of indicators to measure the different dimensions of soft power. Overall, 
78 sub-indices (see Appendix 1) were selected to materialize the six categories of soft power 
resources: Culture, Digital, Education, Engagement, Enterprise and Government. Meanwhile, the 
effects of soft power are measured with seven indicators, namely, the public perception of cuisine, 
tech products, friendliness, culture, luxury goods, foreign policy and liveability with the aid of 
polling data.
Figure 4. Frequency of institutions adopted as data sources in Portland 30 Index.
Source: McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
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The embodiment of American democratic values in the index can be detected by examining the 
government sub-index. The aim of government sub-index is to ‘gauge the extent to which a coun-
try has an attractive model of governance and whether it can deliver broadly positive outcomes 
for its citizens’ (McClory, 2018, p. 32). However, the indicators that the government sub-index 
draws on are the Press Freedom Index, the Freedom House Index, and the World Bank Good 
Governance Rule of Law, all of which are embedded in the three pillars of democracy in the 
United States, namely, freedom of speech (human rights), electoral democracy and rule of law. As 
enlightening as these values are, to equate an ‘attractive model of governance’ with US democ-
racy not only inherits the liberal bias inherent in Nye’s conceptualization of soft power but also 
confirms the US-led liberal order. Freedom House, for instance, has been found to serve as a 
champion of western democracy and tends to score in favour of the United States and its allies 
(Giannone, 2010; Steiner, 2016).
Neo-liberalism, in a similar fashion, finds its positioning in the sub-index of Enterprise. As 
emphasized by Portland’s 2018 report, the Enterprise sub-index does not seek to capsulate ‘eco-
nomic power or output’, but the ‘relative attractiveness of a country’s economic model in terms of 
its competitiveness’, with ‘ease of doing business, corruption levels, and start-up costs for a new 
business’ being the core elements (McClory, 2018). The metrics such as ‘World Bank Ease of 
Doing Business Report’ and ‘Log of Business Start-up Costs as Percentage of GNI per capita’, for 
instance, serve to entrench neoliberal logic in the Portland 30 Index. The ‘Ease of Doing Business 
Index’ champions a deregulated free market with market opening access to foreign investment as 
an ideal economic model. This bias functions to legitimize the neoliberal paradigm and reproduce 
the hierarchy of the international system according to a nation’s openness to foreign investment – 
that largely originates from the west (Broome et al., 2018).
The way that westernized modernization is embedded in the Portland 30 Index is illustrated in 
the Education sub-index. The rationale for including Education in the Portland 30 Index, according 
to McClory (2018), is based on an expectation that foreign student exchange and excellent scholar-
ship significantly contribute to the overseas perceptions of certain countries (Atkinson, 2010; 
Figure 5. World Bank’s contribution to the six categories.
Source: McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
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Olberding & Olberding, 2010). However, the three indicators that are selected to showcase the 
quality of scholarship and international attraction are found to ingrain an Anglo-American hegem-
ony in the education domain. For instance, researchers found that the variables employed in inter-
national university rankings are slanted towards the educational philosophy and the education 
model of its initiating country (Kaba, 2012). In the case of The Times Higher Education ranking, 
criteria such as using English language publication as a proxy of research impact ends up privileg-
ing Anglo-American academic institutions as the ‘good’ and admirable examples (Altbach, 1987). 
That is to say, to embed The Times Higher Education ranking in the Portland 30 Index is to equate 
resemblance to the Anglo-American education model as a signal of educational attractiveness (Lo, 
2011). The resulting soft power benchmark thus legitimizes the hegemonic knowledge production 
and distribution system associated with western dominance.
Treatment of data. In examining the Portland 30 Index reports from 2015 to 2018, we found an 
acute fluctuation of rankings during this period (see Table 1). For example, the United States 
ranked third in 2015, first in 2016, third in 2017 and fourth in 2018. There are two reasons that can 
account for this shift of ranking: one is substantial change in the referent, namely, changes in soft 
power resources or the public perception of the United States; and the other is the optimization of 
the model of representation – in this case, the change is either on the data or in the model design 
(see Table 2). When we examined the scores of 35 countries appearing in the ranking, we found a 
Figure 6. The Portland 30 Index score by country (2015–2018).
McClory, J. (2015). The Soft Power 30, 2015. London: Portland; McClory, J. (2016). The Soft Power 30, 2016. London: Portland; 
McClory, J. (2017). The Soft Power 30, 2017. London: Portland; McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
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simultaneous rise in the scores of all the countries from 2017 to 2018 (see Figure 6). However, 
there is little possibility that the soft power of all the countries being evaluated suddenly increased 
in 2018; therefore, we suspect the volatility of ranking is attributed to the instability of the model, 
which is manifested in two forms.
Table 1. Rankings and scores of countries from the Portland 30 Index reports, 2015–2018.
Rank Score
Country 2015 2016 2017 2018 2015 2016 2017 2018
The United 
Kingdom
1 2 2 1 75.61 75.97 75.72 80.55
Germany 2 3 4 3 73.89 72.6 73.67 78.87
The United States 3 1 3 4 73.68 77.96 75.02 77.8
France 4 5 1 2 73.64 72.14 75.75 80.14
Canada 5 4 5 6 71.71 72.53 72.9 75.7
Australia 6 6 8 10 68.92 69.29 70.15 72.91
Switzerland 7 8 7 7 67.52 67.65 70.45 74.96
Japan 8 7 6 5 66.86 67.78 71.66 76.22
Sweden 9 9 9 8 66.49 66.97 69.32 74.77
Netherlands 10 10 10 9 65.21 64.14 67.89 73.79
Denmark 11 13 11 11 63.20 62.57 65.48 70.7
Italy 12 11 13 12 63.09 63.79 64.7 70.4
Austria 13 17 14 17 62.00 60.99 63.75 67.23
Spain 14 12 15 14 61.70 63.47 63.57 69.11
Finland 15 14 17 15 60.19 62.13 62.37 67.71
New Zealand 16 16 18 18 60.00 61.51 61.96 66.68
Belgium 17 18 16 16 58.85 59.7 62.8 67.25
Norway 18 15 12 13 57.96 61.64 65.2 69.6
Ireland 19 20 19 19 55.61 57.02 60.62 62.78
Korea, Rep. 20 22 21 20 54.32 51.44 58.4 62.75
Singapore 21 19 20 21 52.50 58.09 58.55 62.44
Portugal 22 21 22 22 48.97 51.79 54.43 57.98
Brazil 23 24 29 29 46.63 47.69 47.41 50.69
Poland 24 23 24 24 46.50 48.07 51.27 54.14
Greece 25 25 23 23 45.73 46.98 52.17 54.63
Israel 26 – – – 44.51 – – –
Czech Republic 27 29 27 26 43.26 44.43 48.73 52.64
Turkey 28 – 30 – 42.55 – 45.35 –
Mexico 29 – – – 42.52 – – –
China 30 28 25 27 40.85 45.04 50.5 51.85
Argentina – 30 – 30 – 44.17 – 48.89
Russia – 27 26 28 – 46.58 49.6 51.1
Hungary – 26 28 25 – 46.96 48.16 53.49
Source: McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
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First of all, we consider that addition, alteration, and reduction of specific indicators in the met-
ric package would contribute to the shifting soft power ranking during the period 2015–2018. This 
may influence the ranking of a certain country without any substantial change in soft power policy 
or public perception. To name an illustrative example, the addition of the Michelin Guide into the 
Cultural sub-index co-occurs with the ascendency of France’s ranking from fifth in 2016 to first in 
2017. ‘Culinary culture’ in the 2015 and 2016 reports was assessed purely with polling data. 
However, in 2017, the Soft Power 30 Index added the number of Michelin starred restaurants by 
country as an indicator of culinary attractiveness. Despite the prevalence of the Michelin Guide and 
the reputation of French cuisine, adding the Michelin Guide as a metric of Cultural attractiveness 
has the effect of artificially elevating France’s ranking. The Michelin Guide or Red Guide has been 
shown to shape ‘global fine dining culture’ with the ideal of French haute cuisine. Research has 
found that the distribution of Michelin recognized restaurant network is considerably Europe-
centric, with most of the three-starred restaurants having chefs born in France (Lane, 2011). The 
Michelin Guide can be construed as biased not only because that it assumes the supremacy of 
French culinary culture (Mennell, 1996) but also because of its lack of authority to appreciate the 
broader genres of world cuisine. Despite its footprint in Japanese and Hong Kong, the Michelin 
Guide did not enter the Mainland Chinese market until 2016, when it made its debut in Shanghai. 
In its last report in 2019, the only three-starred restaurant in Shanghai is Ultraviolet, which was 
launched by the renowned French chef Paul Pairet (Michelin, 2018). From this sense, Michelin 
Guide can hardly qualify as a neutral cosmopolitan culinary evaluation, but rather is a Euro-centric 
restaurant recommendation system that by no means reflects the real culinary soft power resources 
of all countries.
Furthermore, we found that the weighting of each category (sub-index) fluctuates with the favour-
ability polling result (see Table 3). In the three persuader reports, all the indicators within each sub-
index were given equal weighting as there is ‘no justification found in the literature for weighting 
some variables more than others’ (McClory, 2010, 2011, 2012) However, since 2015, Portland 
decided to change the equal weighting method, and weigh the sub-indexes with the coefficient 
Table 2. Changes in index-building of the Portland 30 Index, 2015–2018.
Year 2016 2017 2018
Changes 1. Updated data with 
latest sources;
2. Added new metrics;
3. Assigned different 
weighting to the 
seven categories of 
subjective data
1. Updated data with latest 
sources;
2. Added new metrics and 
drop some metrics;
3. Enhanced the data 
normalization process 
in order to mitigate 
distortions from a small 
number of metrics;
4. Developed a system for 
weighting the objective 
data differently using 
regression analysis
1. Updated data 
with latest 
sources;
2. Comprised three 
alterations to 
objective data;




Source: McClory, J. (2016). The Soft Power 30, 2016. London: Portland. P32; McClory, J. (2017). The Soft Power 30, 
2017. London: Portland. P34; McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland. P63.
192 Global Media and China 4(2)
derived from regression method. Specifically, regression was run with the favourability polling as the 
dependent variable, and the remaining seven metrics of the subjective data/six sub-indices of the 
objective data as the independent variables (see Figure 7). The results of the regression analysis give 
each of the independent variables a ‘coefficient’, which is used as the ‘weighting’ to construct the 
value of the subjective/objective component of the soft power index. This favourability-based 
Figure 7. Summary of the Portland 30 Index’s index building process.
Source: The Soft Power 30 2018. McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
Table 3. Changes in weighting of the objective sub-indices in the Portland 30 Index, 2015–2018.
Culture Digital Education Engagement Enterprise Government
Portland 30 
Index 2015
Equal weighting of 
each sub-index
16.67% 16.67% 16.67% 16.67% 16.67% 16.67%
Portland 30 
Index 2016





using a regression 
analysis with 
polling data of 
favourability as 
dependent variable
8.90% 9.80% 11.60% 12.60% 12.50% 14.60%
Portland 30 
Index 2018
12.70% 14.00% 16.60% 17.90% 18.00% 20.80%
Source: McClory, J. (2015). The Soft Power 30, 2015. London: Portland; McClory, J. (2016). The Soft Power 30, 2016. 
London: Portland; McClory, J. (2017). The Soft Power 30, 2017. London: Portland; McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 
30, 2018. London: Portland.
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weighting system is neither theoretically nor empirically sound. Theoretically, this method equated 
soft power with favourability, ignoring the chronicity for public opinion to form and the complicated 
process for favourability to transfer to policy changing. Empirically, we question the validity of 
assigning weightings with the regression-derived coefficients to describe the relationship between 
soft power resources and soft power effects.
In the next section, we will consider the measurement method developed by the largest develop-
ing and emerging state, China, and reveal the strategy for China to counter the discursive and cul-
tural hegemony embedded in western soft power benchmarking.
CNIGS
Source of data. Compared to the Portland 30 Index, which incorporates both objective data and 
subjective data, CNIGS relies exclusively on subjective data generated by opinion polls. What it 
shares with the Portland 30 Index, however, is the ever-growing size of sampling, which increased 
from 3017 in the 2013 report to 11,000 in the 2016–2017 report. This speedy expansion of 





List of countries Rationale
2013 3017 7 Developed countries: the United States, the 
United Kingdom (2)
Developing countries: China, India, Brazil, Russia, 
South Africa (5)
Geographic regions;
Stages of economic 
development;
Including five BRICS 
countries
2014 4500 9 Developed countries: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Australia (4)
Developing countries:
China, India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa (5)
Geographic regions;
Stages of economic 
development
2015 9500 19 Developed countries: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
South Korea, Japan, Australia (9)
Developed countries: China, India, Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, 




11,000 22 Developed countries: the United States, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Japan, 
Australia, Spain, Netherland, Chile (12)
Developing countries: China, India, Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, 
Turkey, Mexico, Russia (10)
Geographical 
regions
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; CNIGS: China National Image Global Survey.
Source: China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration. (2013). 2013 China Global National Image Global Survey. 
China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration; China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration. (2014). 2014 
China Global National Image Global Survey. China Foreign languages Publishing Administration; China Foreign Languages 
Publishing Administration. (2015). 2015 China Global National Image Global Survey. China Foreign languages Publish-
ing Administration; China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration. (2018). 2016-17 China Global National Image 
Global Survey. China Foreign languages Publishing Administration.
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sampling could be explained by the heavy soft power investment from the Chinese government 
under the umbrella project of ‘Tell China’s Stories Well’ (Lim & Bergin, 2018). Since 2014, 
CNIGS settled on a sampling strategy to collect 500 questionnaires from each country. With the 
number of nations increased from 9 (in 2014) to 22 (in 2017), the sampling size expanded propor-
tionately from 4500 to 11,000 (see Table 4). The expanding collection of nations, however, is not 
a random process. The authors found three considerations underlying the sampling of nations: (1) 
representativeness of geographical regions, (2) stages of economic development and (3) member-
ship of emerging intergovernmental organizations.
In regards to geographical distribution, CNIGS includes at least one country for each main 
continent, Asia, Europe, Oceania, North America, South America, and Africa to ensure global 
inclusivity. The first report issued in 2014 put the opinion polls generated by Chinese domestic 
citizens in parallel with overseas poll results to highlight the difference between external evalua-
tion and self-evaluation. The survey conducted on domestic public continues in the following 
research, though the results stop being disclosed since 2015. However, by examining the 2014 
report, we realized that the domestic survey can be utilized to figure out Chinese domestic citi-
zens’ self-identity.
In addition, the rationale of integrating both developed and developing countries is manifest in 
a relatively even composition of nation-states. The ratio between developed and developing coun-
tries has fluctuated around 1:1, with the number of developing countries superseding that of 
developed states in 2014 (4:5) and 2015 (9:10), while the pattern was reversed in 2017 (12:10) 
(see Table 4). This ratio matters because the overall scores of ‘overseas average’ rating will be 
slanted towards over-represented groups – which is either developed or developing countries.
Last but not least, the membership of key emerging international organizations provides a way 
for corresponding countries to enter the sampling basket of CNIGS (see Table 4). The emerging 
international organizations refer to BRICS and G20 in this case. First, the five members of BRICS 
have been included since 2013, which reflects the salience of BRICS cooperation mechanisms in 
China’s perspective. The emphasis on BRICS can be linked to China’s self-identity as a developing 
country. As has been reiterated by Chinese government and media, China considers itself as a 
developing country; China will remain a reliable and sincere friend to developing countries regard-
less of the changes of international realities (Han, 2018; Xinhua, 2018b). The positive attitude 
towards BRICS countries not only derives from the influence that these countries exert on regional 
economies and the international economy (Ding, 2018), but it also recognizes the institutional 
infrastructure under the BRICS umbrella such as the ‘New Development Bank’ and ‘BRICS+N’, 
which underpins China’s growing significance in global governance. In this sense, monitoring the 
public opinion of BRICS countries will inform China’s foreign policy in the management of over-
seas interest and global leadership building.
Selection of indicator. While it is a comprehensive opinion poll, CNIGS does not include any spe-
cific metrics. However, the questions that are listed in the report can be viewed as the potential 
indicators of China’s soft power measurement. The authors identified 24 questions from the CNIGS 
2016–2017 report and coded the questions according to the definition of six sub-indices and 
matched these with the subjective categories in the Portland 30 Index (see Appendix 3) to distin-
guish the similarities and differences between the two reports. We found the compositional struc-
ture of CNIGS highly resembles that of the Portland 30 Index, with 74.9% of the questions falling 
into the four objective sub-indices and one subjective question – general favourability. What is 
worth noting are the two emerging new categories, Communication and Relations, which each 
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include two questions. The Relation indicator can be defined as the questions that explore people’s 
general attitude towards their country’s diplomatic relations with China. As Lock (2010) has 
emphasized, soft power is a relational concept and thus should not be conflated with structural 
forms of power. The fact that people from different cultural backgrounds will develop divergent 
attitudes towards certain cultural resources means that the evaluation of soft power must take into 
account the intersubjectivity of soft power.
The communication category aims to capture the main channels for overseas citizens to access 
the soft power of a certain country. The creation of this category, the author argues, fills in the gap 
of soft power assessment by stretching the object of evaluation from resources, and effects to the 
projection channel. Although the Portland soft power index has put both resources and effects 
under examination, it leaves the mechanisms of soft power projection underdeveloped. Nevertheless, 
how and to what extent soft power can reach the audience is as important as the content of soft 
power. By posing the question ‘What are the main channels for you to learn about China’, the sur-
vey unveils the main information sources that shape overseas opinions of China. This approach 
provides a self-evaluation of the effects of China’s cultural diplomacy, external communication, 
and international trade. As the 2018 report indicates, made-in-China products play an important 
role for overseas citizens to understand China. However, China’s new media abroad seems to fail 
to tell Chinese stories well considering the huge gap between government investment and the low 
rate of viewership (China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, 2018).
Treatment on data. CNIGS did not normalize the survey results to make the scores for each question 
comparable, for instance, with the Portland 30 Index. While the interviewees of Portland soft power 
index were expected to rate their attitude on an 11-point scale, where the positivity increase from 0 to 
10, CNIGS employed multiple survey questions and scales of measurement. When it came to the image 
of China, such as perceptions of China’s contribution to global governance and performance in domes-
tic governance, the 11-point scale was also used by CNIGS to test the general impression of China 
among the overseas population. Nevertheless, the way that CNIGS bridges the gap between soft power 
resources and soft power effects is by exploring the cognitive frames that mediate foreign citizens’ 
interpretation of China. This type of information can be best captured by multiple choice or open-ended 
questions. In this case, CNIGS developed a series of multiple-choice questions to map out the specific 
reasons underlying changes in public opinion. For instance, after collecting the impression of China 
with a scale of 0–10, CNIGS posed a further question to probe the reasons why people give the scores. 
It turns out that ‘A big oriental country with a rich history and full of charm’, ‘A contributor to global 
development’ and ‘A responsible major country and an active participant in global governance’ are the 
main explanations. However, we do have reasons to suspect some flaws in the comprehensiveness of 
the options provided. The questions and the options are designed in a way that favors positive over nega-
tive perceptions. The third type of questions is designed in a Likert-type scale fashion. Similar to rating-
scale questions, Likert-type scales can be used to measure the level of attitude in a more flexible way. 
By using this method, China’s role in BRICS is shown to be demonstrably positive.
Another contribution that CNIGS makes to the soft power measurement is to present the evaluative 
attitude against the respective age group, which indicates how the same soft power policy works on 
people of different ages. In CNIGS’s report, most of the data were presented in three age categories: 
18–35 (young), 36–50 (middle-age) and 51–65 (elderly). The last presidential election in the United 
States and Brexit has demonstrated that the public evaluation of public policy and foreign entities does 
not only vary along with cultural backgrounds and economic status, but among age demographics. 
Monitoring the differences in how people of different ages perceive a certain country will not only 
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inform an ‘age-customized’ soft power policy, but can trace the fluctuation of soft power effects in the 
long term. For instance, among the general overseas citizens, although the perception of Chinese medi-
cine and food is positively correlated with age, the amount of knowledge that people have about China 
demonstrates the reverse trend. Young people tend to get to know China from sources apart from tra-
ditional Chinese culture. Moreover, people’s perception of certain countries can be precipitated into 
stereotypes which are formed and maintained in the long run. Therefore, by checking the difference 
among age groups, it is possible for the soft power report to trace the soft power effects both in the long 
term and in a retrospective fashion. In other words, though the survey has been only conducted in the 
past 6 years, it can actually trace the shift of China’s soft power in the past half a century.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the measurement of soft power is far from a neutral scientific process, 
but rather a symbolic site where ideologies, values and interests are concealed behind tables and 
graphs. This article argues that the symbolic embodiment of political bias is manifested in three 
mechanisms: (1) the selection of data, (2) the selection of indicators and (3) the treatment of data. 
The data that are included in any research should be viewed as a source of a river; if the sampling 
itself is biased, then it is impossible to lead to scientifically sound results. We found that the type 
of data, that is, objective and subjective data, determines which aspect of soft power is being meas-
ured. While the Portland 30 Index adopted a hybrid approach that synthesizes subjective opinion 
polls and objective data, CNIGS relied solely on opinion polls. The concentration of Portland’s 
source of data on dominant western institutions reproduces western dominance in international 
knowledge production hierarchy while CNIGS’ reliance on independently collected subjective 
data serves to erase the dependence of the Global South on the Global North.
The indicators are still the most explicit way for values to be embedded in the measurement of 
soft power. In the Portland 30 Index, American democratic, neoliberal values and Westernized mod-
ernization perspectives are embedded in the selection of indicators. Although sharing the majority 
of categories of soft power with the Portland 30 Index, CNIGS puts an emphasis on examining the 
communicational and relational aspects of soft power. Moreover, the indicators of CNIGS feature 
China’s characteristics, making it harder to be applied to measure the soft power performance of 
other nations. Last but not least, this research finds the trans-annual comparison of Portland index 
rankings unreliable because of the volatility of the underlying model, while CNIGS’s classification 
of data according to age and development status provides an alternative model to capture soft power 
effects in different demographic groups. In one word, on the battlefield of soft power benchmarking, 
the western established countries and emerging powers are competing fiercely to normalize and 
legitimize the political values and international status that they harbour.
Finally, the authors recognize the limitations on the comparability of the two cases, with one as 
a comprehensive benchmark/ranking and the other as a national image survey. However, we con-
sider that such differences do not preclude a comparison of the political intent, cultural constraints 
and value bias via methodological analysis. For further research, the authors recommend further 
comparisons, such as comparing CNIGS with other nation-specific national image surveys and 
comparing the Portland 30 Index with other rankings such as Emerging Markets Soft Power Index.
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Appendix 1
Summary of metrics in Portland 30 Index.
Metric Indicator
Culture Total number of tourist arrivals
Average spend per tourist (total tourism receipts divided by the number of tourists)
Number of films appearing in major film festivals
Number of foreign correspondents in the country
Number of UNESCO World Heritage sites
Annual museum attendance of global top 100
Size of the music market
Number of top 10 albums in foreign countries
Olympic medals (Summer 2016/Winter 2018)
FIFA Ranking (Men’s)
Quality of national air carrier
Michelin starred restaurants
Power Language Index (PLI)
Digital Facebook followers for heads of state (outside of the country)
Facebook engagement score for heads of state or government  
(outside of the country)
Facebook followers for the ministry of foreign affairs (outside of the country)
Facebook engagement score for the ministry of foreign affairs (outside of the country)
Number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants
Secure Internet servers per 1 million people
Mobile phones per 100 people
Internet bandwidth (thousands Mpbs)
Government Online Services Index
E-participation Index
Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people
Education Average of OECD PISA science, maths and reading scores
Gross tertiary educational enrolment rate
Number of top global universities
Number of academic science journal articles published
Number of international students in the country
Spending on education as a percentage of GDP
Engagement Total overseas development aid
Overseas development aid/GNI
Number of embassies abroad
R&D spending as a percentage of GDP
Number of consulates general abroad
Number of permanent missions to multilateral organizations
Membership of international organizations
Asylum seekers per 1000 people
Number of diplomatic cultural missions
Number of countries a citizen can visit visa-free
Size of weekly audience of the state broadcaster
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Zhang and Wu 201
Metric Indicator
Enterprise Global patents led (percentage of GDP)
WEF Competitiveness Index
Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
Heritage Economic Freedom Index score
Corruption Perceptions Index score
R&D spending as a percentage of GDP
Global Innovation Index score
Global Talent
World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report
Unemployment rate as a percentage of labor force
Hi-tech exports as a percentage of manufactured exports
Log of business start-up costs as a percentage of GNI per capita
Government Human Development Index score
Freedom House Index score
Number of think tanks in the country
Gender Equality Index score
Economist Democracy Index score
Size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP
Homicides per capita
World Bank Voice and Accountability Index score
Capital punishment carried out in 2016
Income inequality - Gini coefficient
World Economic Forum Trust in Government Index score
Press Freedom Index score
World Bank Government Effectiveness score
World Bank Good Governance Regulation Quality score
World Bank Good Governance Rule of Law score
Population well-being
Source: The Soft Power 30 2018.McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
Appendix 2
Appendix 1. (Continued)
Codebook: Geographical distribution of sources of data in Portland 30 Index.
Location Definition Example sources
United States The headquarter of the organization is 
located in the United States
World Bank
United Kingdom The headquarter of the organization is 
located in the United Kingdom
Skytrax
France The headquarter of the organization is 
located in France
Organization for Economic  
Co-operation and Development
Switzerland The headquarter of the organization is 
located in Switzerland
International Olympic Committee
Australia The headquarter of the organization is 
located in Australia
Lowy Institute
Spain The headquarter of the organization is 
located in Spain
UN World Tourism Organization
Source: The Soft Power 30 2018.McClory, J. (2018). The Soft Power 30, 2018. London: Portland.
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Appendix 3
Codebook: CNIGS survey questions classifications (similarities and differences in categories compared to 











Culture 6 What is the image of 
China in your eyes
Similar.
In the Portland 30 Index, culture is treated 
as objective data and defined as: It captures 
the quality and the international reach and 
appeal of a country’s cultural production.







In the Portland 30 Index, engagement is 
treated as objective data and defined as: It 
captures the ability of states to engage with 
international audiences, drive collaboration, 
and ultimately shape global outcomes.
Enterprise 5 How do you 
view Chinese 
enterprises’ entry and 
development in your 
country?
Similar.
In the Portland 30 Index, enterprise is 
treated as objective data and defined as: 
It captures the relative attractiveness of a 
country’s economic model in terms of its 
competitiveness, capacity for innovation, 
and ability to foster enterprise and 
commerce.
Government 2 How do you view 
China’s ruling party?
Similar.
In the Portland 30 Index, government 
is treated as objective data and defined 
as: It assesses a state’s political values, 
public institutions, and major public policy 
outcomes
Favourability 2 What is the image of 
China in your eyes
Similar.
In the Portland 30 Index, culture is 
treated as subjective data and defined as: 




Communication 2 What are the main 
channels for you to 
learn about China?
Different.
CNIGS’s exclusive indicator: What are 
the channels for soft power projection or 
how does the overseas audience access 
information about a certain country.




CNIGS’s exclusive indicator: It captures 





CNIGS: China National Image Global Survey.
